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Conceiving of stimuli and responses as causes and effects,
and assuming that rats acquire representational models
of causal relations from Pavlovian procedures, previous
work by causal model theory proponents attempted to
train rat subjects to represent stimulus A as a cause of
both stimulus B and food. By these assumptions, with
formal help from Bayesian networks, self-production of
stimulus B should reduce expectation of alternative causes,
including stimulus A, and their effects, including food.
Reduced feeder-directed responding to stimulus B when
self-produced has been taken as evidence for a general
causal reasoning capacity among rats involving mental
maps of causal relations. Critics have rejoined that response
competition can explain these effects. The present research
replicates the key effect, but uses continuous and finer-
grained measurement of a broader range of behaviours.
Behaviours not recorded in previous studies contradict
both prior explanations. Even results cited in support of
these explanations, when measured in finer detail and
continuously over longer periods, show patterns not expected
by either view, but supportive of a specific-process approach
with attention to motivational factors. Still, the abstract
prediction from Bayesian networks holds, providing a
potentially complementary normative analysis. Behaviour
systems theory provides firmer framing for such theories than
representational-map alternatives.
1. Introduction
Amid oceans of research and theory on learning—sometimes
conceived in cause–effect terms, sometimes not—questions about
post-learning processing, of the manner theories of causal
reasoning concern, have received comparatively little research
attention. In one such study, Blaisdell et al. [1] (‘Causal
reasoning in rats’) showed that behaviour of rats conformed to
a prediction of a theory of causal reasoning not anticipated by
alternatives.
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
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Figure 1. The causal model hypothesized to have been acquired in the experiment. Arrows indicate causal relations: light causes tone;
light causes food; lever causes tone (see footnote 1).
Table 1. Procedure and Blaisdell et al.’s [1] prediction.
group phase 1 phase 2 test prediction
RI (response independent) light, then tone light, then food tone (yoked to LD) default response levels
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LD (lever dependent) light, then tone light, then food lever produces tone reduced response levels
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The rationale of the experiment involves two very different theories of causal reasoning. Following
causal model theory (CMT) [2], Blaisdell et al. [1] assumed that rats would perceive and represent
preceding stimuli in a Pavlovian setting as causes of following stimuli, and integrate multiple Pavlovian
associations into representational models of causal relations. With these assumptions, they devised a
training procedure to produce in rats the representational model illustrated in figure 1. In a final test, the
rats found a lever in the chamber. For one group of subjects, contacting the lever produced the familiar
tone stimulus from the training trials. These subjects were assumed to quickly come to see the tone as an
effect of lever press. The other group received the same pattern of stimulus presentation irrespective of
their actions (yoked control). Table 1 depicts the design.
If the model in figure 1 is, in some sense, an accurate depiction of what Blaisdell et al.’s [1] subjects
acquired, a second theory makes a prediction. Bayesian networks is foremost a smart way to deal with
conditional probabilities, and this makes it available as a normative theory of what a rational agent ought
to expect under a range of conditions [3]. Bayesian networks does not predict the model in figure 1, but it
does predict what a rational possessor of such a model might expect when presented information about
the modelled events. The path from lever to food involves two conditional dependencies. First, two
effects (tone and food) of a common cause (light) become dependent on each other when the occurrence
of the light is unknown [3]. Hearing the tone, expectation of food should heighten. That rats check
food troughs in such circumstances is neither news (cf. [4]), nor problematic for mainstream views of
learning.
Second, two causes (lever contact and light) of a common effect (tone) become dependent on each
other, given the occurrence of tone [3]. In this case, the conditional relationship is negative; hearing
the tone, having contacted the lever reduces otherwise heightened expectation of light. This in turn
reduces expectation of other effects of the light, such as food delivery. By analogy, having pressed
one’s own doorbell, the chime is no longer good evidence of a caller. By this reasoning, rats should
reduce responding to a stimulus indirectly predictive of food when that stimulus can be attributed to an
alternative cause unrelated to food, such as one’s own lever press. This is the novel prediction Blaisdell
et al. [1] supported: rats checked a food trough less in response to a lever-produced tone than did yoked
control subjects to a response-independent (RI) tone. They concluded that this was evidence for ‘the core
competency of reasoning with causal models’ (p. 1022).
This is the starting point of the current study: the prediction in focus has been supported. Three
potential explanations are examined: (i) causal model theory, the view given by the authors of the
original study [2,5]; (ii) response competition [6]; and here we present (iii) a behaviour systems-
derived hypothesis that the divergence of responding between the two groups of rats is due to
their being in different motivational circumstances. Although all three explanations account for the
key result described above, they differ in the specific response topographies expected to produce
it. To differentiate among these explanations, the current study replicates the demonstration using a
finer-grained measurement scheme, recording continuously, and recording other pertinent behaviours.






1.1.1. Causal model theory
Blaisdell et al. [1] presented their results as suggesting a general capacity for abstract causal reasoning,
speaking in terms of causal models, and elsewhere, as supporting CMT [2,5]. By this view, ‘animals have
a natural tendency to translate covariations into causal-model representations’ [2, p. 310]. The animal will
encode relations according to mental maps of causes and effects that then provide a basis for reasoning
about those relations. CMT attributes to the animal a kind of representational theory or model consisting
of structured representations of causal relations. By CMT, figure 1 is not merely a computational-level
abstraction (sensu [8]), but a literal depiction of a representational map acquired by the subjects.1 The
reduction in response to the self-produced tone is viewed as the animal’s mentally discounting the
stimulus as an indicator of food.
1.1.2. Response competition
Dwyer et al. [6] replicated the primary demonstration in focus in [1], but measured lever pressing
in addition to nosing of the feeder, and found group differences in both measures. Unsurprisingly,
lever pressing was much greater on lever press-produced presentations. Dwyer et al. [6] concluded
that the animal might nose the feeder less during lever press-produced presentations simply due to
being otherwise occupied at the onset of the tone with an incompatible response, pressing the lever.
Importantly, by this explanation, the results of [1] are an artefact of the specific procedure, rather
than reflecting a quality of the animal, and so appeal to a normative theory of causal reasoning is not
appropriate, and the apparent correspondence with Bayesian networks is spurious.
1.1.3. Behaviour systems
Behaviour systems perspectives [10–14] (overviewed in [15]) assume that behaviour exists in systems
with identifiable structure, and place focus on the production, timing, and motivational context of
specific sequences of behaviour. This perspective provides a third explanation for the effect in focus,
that it is produced by the interdependence of feeding-related motivational states.
To understand the behaviour of rats in these circumstances requires recognition that manipulating
a prey-sized protrusion, such as the lever, in a food-conditioning experiment is often an expression
of feeding motivation [16]. It readily develops among rats under restricted feeding that are placed, at
mealtime, in a feeding context, and resembles predatory responding of rodents to live crickets [17]. By
a behaviour systems view, therefore, lever manipulation is no arbitrary operant, particularly in feeding
contexts. Likewise, nosing any available crevice is a feeding-related behaviour that readily develops in
such experiments. Response levers and food troughs in standard conditioning chambers take the form
they do, because they have undergone a selection process to produce reliable behaviour [13]. As part of
a single system, these two behaviours occur in sequences, such that the performance of one predicts the
performance of the other.
In Blaisdell et al. [1], behaviour was measured in two very particular circumstances that differ in
an important respect. In one group, presentation begins when the animal makes lever contact. In the
other, the stimulus appears irrespective of current activity or state. By a behaviour systems perspective,
responding is expected to differ under these two circumstances due to differences in the current
motivational state of the animal. By grabbing or biting the lever, the rat in one group is indicating a
momentary high of feeding motivation. It is because the stimulus occurs at this point in the sequence of
behaviour that the topography of response is so specific, and qualitatively different from when the same
tone is presented at other times. As Dwyer et al. [6] demonstrated, rats behave differently under these
two circumstances, with persistent lever contact in the former case, and primarily nosing of the feeder
in the latter. Contrary to Dwyer et al. [6], we attribute the divergence in form of response to qualities of
the animal, rather than to the circumstance. Hence, application of normative theories of causal reasoning
may yet be appropriate, in principle; it is as meaningful to ask whether motivational structures follow
prescriptions of Bayesian networks, as whether mental models do. Contrary to Blaisdell et al. [1], by
whose view subjects should discount self-produced stimuli, we expect subjects to be at a motivational
peak when they press.
1There is ambiguity regarding whether the lever–tone association is conceived as part of the subjects’ representational model, or should
be represented differently, as ‘intervention’. The model as drawn is more general than versions that represent intervention differently.
Such distinctions affect neither Blaisdell et al.’s [1] analysis nor the present analysis. The status of intervention among rats is a separable,





1.2. A difference in measurement
The measurement scheme used in [1] and replication attempts (e.g. [6]) is insufficient for the purpose of
comparing the models under consideration in three important ways: it (i) overlooks relevant behaviours,
(ii) ignores relevant periods, and (iii) measures in overly gross increments. We measure multiple relevant
behaviours, continuously over the entire session, and in sufficiently fine increments to address the
hypotheses.
Blaisdell et al. [1] began recording at the onset of stimulus presentation, when the lever-dependent
(LD) rat contacted the lever and the tone was presented to both animals, leaving pre-stimulus behaviour
undocumented. Instead, Blaisdell et al. [1] compared stimulus period responding with a post-stimulus
period (10–20 s after cessation). This is non-standard, and a less satisfying comparison, since effects
of the manipulation may continue to affect the animals’ behaviour differentially, and it provides no
way of determining whether the subjects were in similar condition at the moment the stimulus was
presented. In this case in particular, since presentation was response-dependent for one group and
response-independent for the other, the pre-stimulus period has specific relevance. In the current study,
recording of behaviour is continuous, which allows recovery of the crucial time period immediately prior
to lever contact.
Blaisdell et al. [1] (also [6,18]) measured behaviour in 10 s increments. Their causal model hypothesis
did not motivate finer-grained measurement. However, to satisfactorily address response competition
does require temporally narrower focus. The levers in Blaisdell’s and Dwyer’s chambers are next to
the food trough. Rats can and do engage both simultaneously, keeping one hand on the feeder while
working the lever. If having contacted the lever impedes subsequent behaviour tangibly, the interference
should be disproportionately early in the stimulus period, which cannot be determined from data binned
in 10 s intervals. It is a time-sensitive hypothesis, and to test it requires consideration of behaviour in
finer increments. The behaviour systems-based hypothesis is similarly time-sensitive. The present study
measures behaviour in 2 s periods.
Blaisdell et al. [1] measured only one response: nosing of the feeder. Dwyer et al. [6] also measured
lever contact, ostensibly to assess the role of response competition. By a behaviour systems view, three
categories of related behaviours are pertinent to measure in a feeding situation. In addition to nosing of
the feeder (a focal-appetitive behaviour), and lever contact (a consummatory behaviour), we measured
a general-appetitive behaviour, movement around the chamber. Although these measures are motivated
by a behaviour systems perspective, and the other two views do not explicitly anticipate patterns of these
other behaviours, this does not imply theoretical neutrality. Some patterns of these other behaviours are
inconsistent with the other two views, and so these measures help to differentiate among the available
hypotheses.
2. Methods
In addition to the differences in measurement stressed above, our experiment uses a different apparatus,
different strain and sex of rat, and different food than in [1] (and [5], which was faithful to the former).
2.1. Subjects
Twenty experimentally naive female Sprague–Dawley rats served as subjects (10 per group). For the
course of the experiment, they were housed individually on a 12-hour light:dark schedule. They were fed
once daily, 1–3 h after dark, and maintained at a minimum of 85% of their free-feeding weights (median
weight: 290.5 g; median age: 499 days). Water was freely available in home cages.
2.2. Apparatus
The testing apparatus consisted of pairs of chambers made of sheet metal (50 × 35.5 × 30 cm), Plexiglas
ceiling, and accessed by a hinged Plexiglas front wall. These were in sound attenuating cabinets in
one room, 20 cm apart, and linked to data-logging and control equipment in an adjacent room. The
food trough (3.1 cm wide, 5.9 cm high, 1.8 cm deep, 4 cm above floor) detected intrusions by an infrared
sensor. Food delivery consisted of two 45 mg Testdiet purified pellets (1 s apart) released into the feeder.
The lever (3.6 cm wide) was retractable, and only extended in phase 3 (5.2 cm from the feeder; 4 cm
above the floor, 5.1 cm from the back wall). The light and speaker were next to each other 1.6 cm above





light (1 s−1). Two pressure-sensitive platforms in the floor of the chambers covered most of the back wall
(10.2 cm wide).
2.3. Procedure
Except where noted, procedures were similar to those in [1] (experiment 2a). All phases of the experiment
were conducted in the dark portion of the day, and in dark experimental chambers (in [1], chambers were
lit). Subjects were run in pairs.
2.3.1. Exposure to the apparatus
For 2 days, subjects were placed in the conditioning chambers for 30 min, with 10 food pellets. All subjects
ate the pellets by the second day.
2.3.2. Phase 1
On each of 4 days, subjects were presented with six presentations (i.e. 24 total) of a 10 s flashing (‘light’),
followed immediately by a 10 s white noise stimulus (‘tone’). Presentations were 3–7 min apart (mean
interval, 5 min). These sessions were 35 min long. In [1], there was a second auditory stimulus presented
alone not included here.
2.3.3. Phase 2
On each of 2 days, 12 presentations of the 10 s flashing light were followed immediately by food delivery
(3–7 min apart, mean: 5 min, total duration: 62 min).
2.3.4. Phase 3
Levers were extended for a single 30 min test period (in [1], these were 60 min). Whenever the LD subject
contacted the lever, the 10 s tone sounded in its own chamber, and in a yoked chamber occupied by its
RI partner. A 30 s refractory period (10 s in [1]) assured spacing of stimuli. RI subjects could not produce
the stimulus.
2.4. Analyses
The conditioning chambers automatically recorded whether, in each 0.1 s interval, the subject was in
contact with the lever, in the food trough, or on either of two platforms along the back chamber wall.
This yields a value of 0–20 for each dependent variable, for each 2 s period. Ten-second bins used in
quantitative analyses are the sum of five adjacent 2 s bins.
2.4.1. Quantitative comparisons
Repeated-measures analyses of variance were conducted to compare groups on each of the three
dependent variables over test sessions (phase 3) for 10 s periods immediately before and during stimulus
presentation. Adjacent pairs of observations were combined in blocks of two. Similar analyses were
conducted on baseline measurements. These consisted of all 10 s periods throughout the 30 min test
session not overlapping with a 30 s stimulus period. A baseline value was ascertained for each 3 min
block, yielding 10 values for each measure and subject. Analyses assume first-order ante-dependent
covariance structure [19] on account of unequal numbers of observations among subjects, unequal
spacing of observations, and a serial quality to the within-subject correlations, expected due to extinction
over non-reinforced presentations. Informative post hoc tests are described where relevant.
2.4.2. Qualitative modelling
The modelled data are the aggregate feeder-directed response quantities for each 2 s parcel over the
30 s period of interest surrounding stimulus presentations (i.e. starting 10 s prior to presentation). The
mean of the remainder (i.e. excluding the same 30 s periods) of 2 s periods throughout sessions for all
subjects provide a baseline. The Nelder–Mead simplex technique [20] was used to estimate unspecified
parameter values, using sum of squared errors of prediction (SSE) between model and data as a measure
of fit. Note that parameter values are specific to the particular variables and measurement scheme used,





not nested, Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to quantify fit. A model that fits in form may
still underestimate or overestimate the extent of an effect. Therefore, in addition to assessing models
with optimally fitting parameters, each model was also assessed with parameter values that would be
required to produce the extent of difference observed.
3. The models
The three views described are all consistent with the finding [1] that rats nose a food trough less on
lever-dependent presentations (LD condition) than response-independent presentations (RI condition),
and they agree regarding response patterns expected on RI presentations. What differentiates the three
interpretations is the behaviour of LD subjects.
While the behaviour systems-based hypothesis predicts distinct response topographies in the two
conditions, the predictions of both causal model and response competition hypotheses concern a
reduction of feeder-directed responding in the LD condition relative to the RI condition. Neither
view predicts specific magnitudes of this difference. However, since they attribute different factors
for the reduction, different patterns of behaviour are implied. Thus, for these two views, we begin by
establishing a descriptive model of RI responding to provide a basis upon which to apply these differing
models of reduction.
We can model the RI condition responding as a Gaussian function as follows:
f (x) = he−((x−p)2/2k2). (3.1)
The term h specifies the height of the curve. The position of the peak is specified by p, which corresponds
to time (in 2 s periods of measurement, 1–15, for a 30 s period, beginning 10 s prior to the tone, including
the 10 s stimulus period, and a 10 s post-stimulus period). Kurtosis is specified by k. A Gaussian function
yields an interpretable response curve, with an initial gradual rise from a baseline, and a similarly
gradual return to the same baseline. As the model of RI condition responding, we take the best fitting





3.1. Expectation reduction hypothesis
By CMT, the lower response to the self-produced tone (in [1,6]) is due to reduced expectation. Thus,
a curve that describes responding well on RI presentations should, by CMT, similarly provide a good
model of responding on LD presentations, except that the height of the curve will be lower (i.e. h is




As this model is essentially about a reduction of expectation, it applies similarly to any explanation
that views the Blaisdell et al. [1] demonstration in such terms. For instance, the associative model of
Kutlu & Schmajuk [21] explains the effect by assuming an inhibitory association between the lever press
and food. The prediction is the same, a general reduction of the height of the response curve. Also, views
that attribute the reduction of responding following lever press to competition for processing demands
in a system with limited capacity [22] might be modelled similarly. Thus, the success or failure of this
model will have implications beyond CMT.
3.2. Response competition hypothesis
By the response competition hypothesis (RCH), the lower feeder-directed responding on lever-produced
presentations is due to the animal’s occupation with the lever at the beginning of the presentation. Like
CMT, RCH does not predict specific response curves, but rather, a reduction in group LD responding
relative to group RI. By RCH, expectation of food is similar in both conditions, and motivation is similar;
h = oh. What is predicted to differ is latency, the position of the response curve. Therefore, the response
competition model of LD condition responding we propose is again based on the descriptive model of























Figure 2. A behaviour systems model of the motivational changes accompanying sequences of feeding behaviour (cf. [24–26]).




A second way to model the effect of response competition is to subtract the hypothesized interference
from the RI default model. As there may be a peak of maximal interference that builds and lessens with
time, it is again convenient to model the interference as a Gaussian function positioned at the moment of
lever contact (i.e. p = 6), with unspecified height (h > 0) and breadth (k > 0):
interfere(x) = he−((x−6)2/2k2). (3.5)
Therefore, we propose equation (3.6) as a second response competition model:
LDRCH2(x) = RI(x) − interfere(x). (3.6)
The same reasoning applies equally to other behaviours: if lever contact interferes with nosing the
feeder, it should interfere no less and in a similar fashion with other potentially competing responses.
Thus, a similar strategy can be taken with other behaviours that negatively correlate with lever contact.
If only some behaviours show the negative relationship predicted, this will require explanation beyond
response competition. Note that the RCH does not make predictions regarding patterns of lever contact.
Occurrence of lever contact in group LD is given by the procedure; persistence of lever contact is not
a prediction.
3.3. Behaviour systems-based behavioural sequence model
By a behaviour systems view, RI and LD subjects encounter the tone under qualitatively different
motivational circumstances. If lever contact is an expression of focused feeding motivation, by grabbing
the lever, the LD animal is showing evidence of being at a motivational climax when the tone appears
and behaviour is measured. This contrasts with the alternative views considered, by which responding
among LD animals is reduced generally. The contrast is especially sharp with views, such as CMT,
that attribute the group difference to reduced expectation among LD subjects. Since the difference
is hypothesized to be qualitative, unlike the above models, our behavioural sequence model of LD
responding cannot bootstrap on a descriptive model of the RI data. However, there are direct theoretical
grounds for predicting specific response topographies, particularly for the case of the LD subject, whose
current motivational condition is revealed by its behaviour.
The form of the response, by this view, is complex, involving general-appetitive, focal-appetitive and
consummatory responses (cf. [23]), each with specific relations to the others, as depicted in figure 2 (after
[24–26]). In the conditioning chambers, the recessed food trough affords nosing, and the protruding lever
affords grabbing and biting. A rat in a consummatory motivational state related to feeding will tend to
grab and bite prey-sized protrusions [17] like the lever;2 a rat in focal-appetitive mode will tend to nose
the food trough, where food has been found before. Conveniently, these are the two responses in focus.
General-appetitive is visible as movement away from the food trough, which in the restricted space of
typical conditioning chambers resembles pacing, much like a polar bear in a zoo circles its enclosure in
the hours prior to mealtime [28].
2Note that lever contact, for instance, is neither exclusively nor essentially a consummatory feeding behaviour. Rather, the lever affords
a particular manner of expression for a rat taken by consummatory motivation in the specific context of the experiment (cf. [27]). Some
earlier writing (e.g. [24–26]) has favoured the phrase ‘handling/consuming’ as a less abstract alternative to ‘consummation’. Despite
superficial similarity between these words, consume and consummate are distinct not only in contemporary usage, but also in their
Latin origins: consūmere (to deplete, exhaust), and cōnsummāre (to complete, accomplish), respectively. The bites of a rat engaged in





In the response-independent condition, the subject receives the tone irrespective of behaviour or state.
As consummatory moments are brief [29], it should more often encounter the tone under focal-appetitive
motivation and nose the feeder, which can be modelled as Gaussian. Hence, all three views are content
with the same model for the RI condition.
When the LD subject produces the stimulus, it is already in the throes of a feeding behaviour sequence.
Lever contact does not appear in a behavioural vacuum. As a consummatory response, it is short-lived,
such that the timing of spontaneous lever contact can be placed in a relatively narrow window, the dotted
curve in figure 2. By controlling the presentations to appear in this very specific and reliable moment in
the motivational sequence, when the rat is furthermore in a specific position and orientation with respect
to the lever, a circumstance is isolated in which the model predicts response topographies with especial
precision.
Although the progression of feeding-related motivational states is assumed to be continuous, as
diagrammed in figure 2, the behaviours produced are discrete and sequential. Feeding behaviours occur
together, but in sequences, rather than all at once, leading the animal along a chain of behaviour patterns
that progressively narrow upon acquiring prey. A rat engaged in consummatory responding towards
the lever is temporarily less inclined to nose the feeder. The model therefore involves the interaction
of two complementary motivational progressions: focal-appetitive mode (‘focal’), encouraging feeder-
directed responding, and consummatory mode (‘consum’), producing consummatory behaviours, to
the exclusion of feeder-directed responding. Thus, our behavioural sequence model of LD condition
feeder-directed responding is as in equation (3.7):
LDBS(x) = focal(x) − consum(x). (3.7)
That is, nosing of the feeder is predicted by the model of focal-appetitive mode, minus the model
for consummatory mode. Again, these two progressions can be appropriately modelled as Gaussian
functions, although this is a simplification of the original Silva–Timberlake [24–26] model, in which no
commitments were intended to symmetrical functions.
As the timing of lever contact relative to stimulus presentation is given by the procedure, the position
of the consummatory mode model is specified: the moment of lever contact, p = 6. Breadth and height are
free parameters. These are the same constraints as in the interference component of RCH2, accentuating
the importance of how these models treat the positive component differently.
consum(x) = he−((x−6)2/2k2). (3.8)
Focal-appetitive is modelled as a Gaussian (as in formula (3.1)) with all three parameters (height,
kurtosis, position) unspecified, leaving five free parameters in the model.
Since the experiment focuses on a moment of peak consummatory motivation, predictions regarding
lever contact are especially clear. As shown in Dwyer et al. [6], lever contact during stimulus periods
should be greater for group LD than group RI. However, since presentations are dependent on lever
contact of group LD, it is necessarily absent in pre-stimulus and baseline periods, making group




The demonstration of primary interest in [1] was replicated: nosing of the food trough during stimulus
presentation was less for group LD than group RI (F1,8.38 = 17.32, p = 0.003; mean difference = 13.10, 95%
CIs = 5.90–20.31; figure 3). No group difference was observed in baseline measurements (F1,31.75 = 0.03).
Both results are consistent with all three views. However, responding in the pre-stimulus period was
greater for group LD than group RI (F1,5.94 = 23.16, p = 0.003; mean difference = 12.40, 95% CIs = 6.08–
18.71). This was predicted by the behavioural sequence model, but not by the alternatives.
4.1.2. Consummation
Lever contact during stimulus presentation was greater for group LD than group RI (F1,19.59 = 14.95,
p = 0.001; mean difference = 11.39, 95% CIs = 5.24–17.55), as also observed in Dwyer et al. [6]. Given that
























Figure 3. Nosing of the food trough in 10 s bins, prior to and during CS presentation, and on baselinemeasurements (estimatedmeans).
Error bars show estimated s.e.m.
the response competition view make predictions regarding patterns of lever contact. Such a comparison
is not appropriate for the baseline or pre-stimulus periods, since timing of the tone is dependent on
lever contact in one group; trivially, lever contact will be greater for RI subjects at these times. Subjects
produced two to nine stimulus presentations by lever contact during phase 3 (median: 5).
4.1.3. General-appetitive
No statistically reliable group differences were revealed by planned tests in movement around the
chamber, as measured by presence on the two platforms along the back wall (pre-stimulus: F1,10.91 = 2.73;
during: F1,20.28 = 1.33; baseline: F1,46.60 = 0.16; p’s > 0.1). Though not significantly greater, mean far
platform values during the tone were at least as high for LD (raw mean: 26.83) as RI subjects (10.83). This
is awkward for the response competition explanation: if having contacted the lever is no impediment to
being on the far side of the chamber, the same starting point can scarcely be used to explain, over the same
period, reduced presence at the feeder, only 4 inches away. This result is likewise counter to the causal
model explanation. If reduction of expectation of food is what causes lower feeder-directed response
to the tone among LD subjects, other feeding-related behaviours should be similarly reduced. Instead,
both lever contact and general locomotion are at least as great in these conditions. In a related study
more directly concerned with intervention [9], greater general locomotion was shown among subjects
for whom a conditional stimulus was self-produced by lever contact, relative to a RI condition.
4.2. Model comparison
4.2.1. Response-independent condition responding
Two of the hypotheses phrase LD condition responding relative to RI condition responding. A Gaussian
function (height = 2.18; position = 9.63; kurtosis = 2.59) fits the RI data well (SSE: 1.42; figure 4). This
provides a default model of conditional feeder-directed responding for the specific circumstance.
Consistent, baseline-level responding was assumed prior to and following presentations (time parcels
1–5 and 16–20). Baseline (1.38) was similar between groups (1.37 for group RI; 1.39 for LD).
4.2.2. Expectation reduction model
The height of the best fitting expectation reduction model is 0.49 (figure 5). The fit to the data is poor (SSE:
41.30; AIC: 16.68). Most obviously, it fails to predict the pre-stimulus peak in responding. No parameter
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Figure 4. RI condition feeder-directed responding and the descriptive model. Vertical lines denote 10 s periods (tone presentation is
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Figure 5. The model based on expectation reduction (h= 0.49), motivated by CMT. The observed LD condition feeder-directed
responding and the descriptivemodel of RI condition responding are presented for comparison. Vertical lines denote 10 s periods. Shading
indicates the stimulus period (6–10).
reason to expect it. Secondly, this model overestimates LD response levels during the tone. Observed
levels are reached only by negative parameter values (h = −0.16; SSE: 43.25), indicating below baseline
responding, not anticipated by any view that attributes the group difference only to reduced expectation.
4.2.3. Response competition
Two response competition models were proposed. The first, RCH1, models the reduction in response as
a temporal shift. The best fit was found to occur at p = 16.64 (figure 6, upper panel). This not only fits
the data poorly (SSE: 38.16; AIC: 15.89), but also attributes an infeasible delay (14 s). Contacting a lever
within arm’s length is not expected to delay a rat 14 s. Furthermore, regardless of parameter values, this
model necessarily overestimates responding during the tone in condition LD, which was below baseline,
and underestimates responding in the pre-stimulus period.
The second response competition model (RCH2) considered treats interference as a second Gaussian
function to be subtracted from the default model. The best fitting parameters also fit intuitions about
the extent of interference feasible, yielding an interference curve with height, h2 = 1.84, and breadth,
k2 = 0.75 (figure 6, middle panel). The model follows the dip observed in the data at the time of lever
press, but otherwise fits the data poorly (SSE: 49.87; AIC: 21.78). Again, RCH2 gives no reason to expect
the pre-stimulus peak in responding. Furthermore, the interference curve is too narrow for the model
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Figure 6. Three response competition models. The observed LD condition feeder-directed responding and the descriptive model of RI
condition responding are presented for comparison. Vertical lines denote 10 s periods. Shading indicates the stimulus period (6–10).
Upper panel: the delay-basedmodel, RCH1 (p= 16.64). Middle panel: the subtraction-basedmodel, RCH2 (h2= 1.84; k2= 0.75). Lower
panel: RCH3, a combination of the delay of RCH1 with the subtraction of RCH2 (p= 16.64; h2= 1.08; k2= 0.13).
given height (1.84), the breadth would have to be an infeasible eight time periods in order to achieve the
observed stimulus-period response levels (SSE: 94.35). This is a general difficulty for RCH; any feasibly
sized interference cannot account for the extent of the observed group differences.
One final effort to accommodate response competition is worth considering. If the delay model and
the interference model were combined by subtracting an interference curve (as in RCH2) from a model
with the position unspecified (as in RCH1), a three-parameter model, a closer fit to the data should be
achieved. The resulting model (figure 6, lower panel) is a disjoint collage of RCH1 and RCH2, with
the same too-late peak of RCH1 (p = 16.64), and a subtraction that fits only the initial nadir (h2 = 1.08;
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Figure 7. The behavioural sequence model, LDBS(x), shown with the observed LD condition feeder-directed responding. Vertical lines
denote 10 s periods. Shading indicates the stimulus period (6–10). Inset: the focal-appetitive (grey dashed line) and consummatory
(dotted) mode models that together produce the behavioural sequence model.
curve is expected to interfere with the bump in responding, not several seconds earlier. Combining the
models this way produces only a slightly better fit (SSE: 37.00; AIC: 23.08).
Although this may not exhaust all ways of modelling the effects of response competition, the
difficulties these attempts raise appear general. The hypothesis does not appear capable of explaining
the magnitude or pattern of difference in response levels observed.
4.2.4. Behavioural sequence model
The behavioural sequence model with optimal parameter values is illustrated in figure 7 (focal-appetitive
curve: h = 10.23; p = 4.67; k = 5.19; consummatory curve: h = 10.13; k = 3.70; as above, baseline = 1.38 was
given). This model fits the data well (SSE: 2.35; AIC: 10.52). The relationship between the models for
focal-appetitive and consummatory modes exhibits several features of Silva et al.’s [24–26] diagram:
‘consum’ was later and narrower than ‘focal’ (pconsum > pfocal; kconsum < kfocal), was temporally contained
by ‘focal’ (pconsum − kfocal < pfocal), and reaches above ‘focal’ only briefly, just after ‘focal’ peaks (at
t = pconsum, hconsum(t) > hfocal(t)). Even without specifying these as constraints to the parameter search,
blind optimization reproduced these relationships drawn in Silva et al.’s [24–26] illustrative diagram
(apparent in inset of figure 7). Note that lever contact appears in temporally narrower spurts than
nosing of the feeder, which in turn is narrower than far platform spurts, as predicted of patterns of
consummatory, focal-appetitive, and general-appetitive behaviours, respectively.
Since all but one of the models considered failed to account for the data even qualitatively, there is no
quantitative contest, and further quantification of fit is superfluous. Still, the quantitative comparison
concurs with the qualitative: AIC of the behavioural sequence model (10.52) is substantially more
favourable than those of the presented alternatives (15.89–23.08). Bayesian information criterion of model
selection, which carries greater penalties for model complexity, yields the same conclusion (behavioural
sequence model: 12.03; alternative models: 16.19–23.99).
4.2.5. Response in the absence of the tone
Although lever contact by RI subjects produced no stimulus, these rats contacted the lever no less, and
their behaviour before and after contact can be analysed as was done for LD subjects. Figure 8 shows
the feeder-directed responding of RI subjects before and after moments of lever contact, along with a
behavioural sequence model, as described above, with optimal parameters. In this case, we were able
to specify not only the position of the consummatory curve (pconsum = 6), but also its height, which we
assumed to be the same as among LD subjects (hconsum = 10.13), leaving four unspecified parameters. The
resultant model fitted the data tightly (SSE: 0.67). In this model, focal(x) was lower (hfocal = 9.75) and later
(pfocal = 6.19) than the corresponding model of LD subjects, and both curves were narrower (kfocal = 3.37,
kconsum = 2.67). As for LD subjects, we see an anticipatory peak of focal-appetitive behaviour, which falls
over the seconds preceding lever contact, leading to a period of below-baseline responding, followed by
a second peak. Hence, the pattern expected by a behaviour systems view is observed even in the absence
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Figure 8. Nosing of the feeder among RI condition subjects before and after moments of lever contact (at time 6). Observed behaviour
is shown, along with the best-fitting behavioural sequence model.
5. Discussion
Blaisdell et al. [1] showed that rats nose a food trough less in response to a self-produced conditional
stimulus than to the same stimulus otherwise. We replicated this result. Three explanations of their
results have been proposed—causal model theory [1], response competition [6], and here, a hypothesis
in terms of motivational sequences, based on behaviour systems theory. These three hypotheses
make qualitatively dissimilar predictions which permit their differentiation. The causal model and
response competition hypotheses anticipate the observed topography of behaviour in neither form nor
composition. The behaviour systems-based hypothesis, by contrast, predicts the observed data well, and
in greater specificity of form and breadth of response type.
5.1. Anticipation of lever contact
When a rat grabs or bites the lever in a food conditioning chamber, it is indicating that it is in the course
of a progression of motivation that began some time before, such that behaviour immediately prior to
lever contact will be predictable. The rat about to take the lever in hand or maw is in a very particular
motivational condition, which should be visible in its behaviour. In particular, it will have just passed
a peak of focal-appetitive behaviour. Elevated nosing of the feeder immediately prior to lever contact
was striking (cf. [5], which reported no such differences, but note the differences of measurement and
their multiple data transformations, particularly their dropping of zeros). Such an anticipatory peak is
an articulated expectation of behaviour systems theory (e.g. [24–26]), and predicted by the behavioural
sequence model for any parameter settings that preserve the hypothesized relations among response
modes. The model moreover predicts the finding that feeder-directed responding falls for several seconds
prior to lever contact (figure 7). These results are awkward for the alternative hypotheses.
5.2. Other causal models
Blaisdell et al. [1] defended the model diagrammed in figure 1 (see footnote 1). However, this is not
the only model consistent with CMT, their training procedures, and their results. In particular, CMT is
not a theory of learning, and so it provides little guidance on how specific training procedures relate
to acquisition of specific causal models. The assumption that subjects would interpret precedence as
causation is more intuitive [30] than principled. It has already been noted [31] that Blaisdell et al.’s [1]
‘common-cause’ training procedure would not be expected to produce the hypothesized common cause
model by a Bayesian learning model, since the tone was not presented independently of food. The matter
is analogous to earlier concerns with using explicitly unpaired conditions as control procedures [32]. The
concern is worth acknowledging, but does not indicate violation of the Markov condition, as claimed
by critics [31]. By some models of learning, conditional independence in the training data is necessary
for the learner to acquire a representation that exhibits conditional independence (e.g. [33]), but not by








Figure 9. An alternative causal model in which the common cause of tone and food is unseen. This is consistent with the results of
Blaisdell et al. [1] and Dwyer et al. [6], and avoids conceptual problems with the Blaisdell et al. [1] model.
One consequence of this flexibility regarding learning is that a number of causal models are consistent
with the training in [1]. Among these alternatives, the model diagrammed in figure 9 deserves attention.
By figure 9, the light is just another effect of an unseen common cause. This retains the relationships
among the tone and food and lever, and so the prediction in focus remains. This model is simpler, better
supported empirically, and avoids some of the conceptual foibles of figure 1.
Notably, Blaisdell et al. [1] violate an assumption important for the rationale of their study in testing
subjects in the absence of the light. By Bayesian networks, two effects of a common cause become
dependent only when occurrence of the causing event is unknown. In Blaisdell et al.’s [1] situation,
however, the purported cause, the light, is not unknown, but absent. Seeing that the light is off, the
probability of food appearing should therefore be regarded as independent of the presence of the tone.
Hence, given the model in figure 1, both groups should respond similarly. It is an interesting fact that the
tone in this study evokes approach to the food trough, but this is not a prediction of the model Blaisdell
et al. [1] highlight (figure 1), unless one assumes that rats are insensitive to the distinction between
absence of knowledge and knowledge of absence, which would appear to undermine normative models
of causal reasoning (cf. [36]). The model in figure 9 provides one solution: the common cause of tone and
food is unspecified, and so unknown, as required for the prediction in focus.
Figure 9 is simpler because it does not require the ungainly premise that rats will interpret the light
as a cause of food or tone just because it precedes it. Empirically, this model fits Dwyer et al.’s [6]
finding that analogous group differences obtain in simultaneous and sensory preconditioning control
conditions, which is another difficulty for Blaisdell et al.’s [1] interpretation. Of course, CMT fares no
better with figure 9 than with figure 1 in face of the data of the present study. However, insofar as a
Bayesian networks analysis is still viable, figure 9 may provide a better starting point than the model
the community has been focusing on. Other graphical model-based theories may be clearer about what
structure the learner is hypothesized to have acquired.
5.3. Control conditions of Blaisdell et al. [1]
Blaisdell et al. [1] provided two ostensible control procedures, ‘direct-cause’ (i.e. simultaneous
conditioning) and ‘causal-chain’ (i.e. sensory preconditioning, cf. [4]), and stressed that response-
dependent groups showed reduced responding only in the experimental condition. By contrast, Dwyer
et al. [6] showed analogous differences with these control procedures as well. This positive finding is
much weightier evidence than Blaisdell et al.’s [1] mere failure to reject the null hypothesis. Absence of
an effect was not properly established, such as by equivalence testing [37], appropriate if weight is to be
placed on a negative finding. In either case, however, the interpretation is not clear, for these ostensible
control procedures neither control all of the relevant variables nor differentiate among the hypotheses
on offer.
The control procedures were designed to discourage explanations in terms of artefacts produced by
the response-dependence of the one group’s presentations. It was important for Blaisdell et al. [1] to
show no group differences in the control procedures, not because it was a positive prediction of CMT,
but because it would counter explanations such as response competition. By showing that the difference
obtains even in these control procedures, Dwyer et al. [6] undermined the pretence that those procedures
silence the challenge of response competition. The parsimony of response competition makes it a weighty
challenge. Addressing this challenge now requires a different strategy.
To be clear, both sets of results are consistent with CMT, as well as with Bayesian networks.
Neither theory specifies the appropriate manner of training to acquire particular causal models. Any
of the training procedures in [1] could have produced their hypothesized causal-model representation





could produce the same set of results. Figures 1 and 9 show just two of many models that are consistent
with CMT, as well as with all training procedures and results of both [1] and [6]. Assertions that the
control conditions in [1] are critical for CMT requires one to follow a trail of unarticulated intuitions to
the specific model highlighted (figure 1). Alas, CMT is not sufficiently specific to give us just one model
for a given training procedure, nor just one way to train a given model.
Furthermore, those control procedures involve multiple moving parts. With the pretence of varying
‘causal models’, the control procedures in [1] leave variables known to affect learning, such as timing and
associative strength, uncontrolled. Most obviously, the ‘direct cause’ training procedure (simultaneous
conditioning) is more direct than the very indirect training in the experimental condition, and so a given
number of pairings is expected to produce much stronger conditioning. In the case of the ‘causal chain’
(sensory preconditioning) condition, the timing of the tone with respect to food delivery is very different
from the experimental condition (T–L; L-food versus L–T; L-food). That such variables will change the
response topography should not be controversial, and yet proponents (e.g. [38,39]) and critics (e.g. [31])
alike have claimed that the Blaisdell et al. [1] demonstration defies alternative theories. These claims were
made too hastily.
5.4. Evidence counter to the causal model hypothesis
Blaisdell et al. [1] reasonably attributed the lower responding to self-produced tones to a reduction
in expectation of food. However, it is not the case that responding is generally weaker on lever-
produced presentations, as their view predicts. On the contrary, rats responded heartily to self-produced
stimuli; though they nosed the feeder less, other feeding-related behaviours were greater on such
presentations. As Dwyer et al. [6] demonstrated, and we replicated, subjects spent more of their time
working the lever on presentations that were self-produced. We furthermore found that movement
around the chamber, another response measure that appears among rats in the context of feeding,
was also high on such presentations (see also [9]). That certain responses were heightened on self-
produced presentations, rather than reduced, clashes with any interpretation based solely on reduction
of expectation. This is especially true once the enthusiastic responding on such trials is recognized to be
feeding-related. Responding is not weak on self-produced presentations; rather, the response topography
differs qualitatively.
By a behaviour systems view, lever contact, and hence the self-produced stimuli, occur not at a low
of expectation, but at an apex of feeding motivation, at which the dominant response is consummatory
rather than appetitive. However, although consummatory behaviour dominates, even focal-appetitive
motivation is expected to be at a high for LD subjects, as is apparent in figure 2. Comparison of the focal-
appetitive component of the behavioural sequence model (h = 10.23; k = 5.19) with the corresponding
model of feeder-directed responding in condition RI (figure 4; h = 2.18; k = 2.59) reveals that the former
is much larger, in both height and breadth. This again suggests that feeding-related motivation is greater
for the rat who pressed for the tone (LD), than for her yoked partner (RI). The expectation of heightened
motivation on lever-induced presentations is in clear conflict with the causal model explanation by
which expectation of food will be reduced on self-produced presentations. Note that this similarly
speaks against any view that predicts the Blaisdell et al. [1] demonstration on the basis of a reduction
of expectation, including associative models (e.g. [21]).
5.5. Evidence counter to the response competition hypothesis
The response competition explanation [6] relies squarely on the claim that lever contact will interfere
with nosing of the feeder in 10 s periods. If LD subjects were slower to respond on account of starting the
trial with a lever press, this could produce a difference in overall response levels during the 10 s period
measured. At shorter intervals, this might appear obvious, but it is less obvious that having contacted
a nearby lever in a small chamber should constitute a measurable impediment to a rat’s feeder-directed
responding over a period as long as 10 s. One might reasonably expect the opposite, since LD subjects are
necessarily always quite close to the food trough at the onset of each presentation, on account of having
just grabbed the lever, whereas RI subjects might be anywhere in the chamber. An appropriate solution
is to quantify how these behaviours correlate.
Dwyer et al. [6] reported a negative correlation of lever contact and nosing the feeder in their
experiments, but only for the period of stimulus presentation, and only when tested irrespective of
condition. Note that this correlation is another way of expressing the previously noted result that lever
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Figure 10. Correlation between lever contact and nosing the feeder for all time scales considered. Grey lines indicate significance criteria
for individual correlations. Reliable correlations are indicated by circles (binomial tests, p< 0.05). Error bars indicate s.e.m.
[6] found no such correlations within conditions in either experiment, and also not in a post-stimulus
period (10–20 s after presentation). This pattern of no correlation in 10 s periods of test sessions, except
during the tone, concords with our results. This might have been sufficient to convince a reader of Dwyer
et al. [6] that response competition does not explain Blaisdell et al.’s [1] results.
A behaviour systems view focuses on how behaviours relate to each other. As expressions of the same
system, lever contact and nosing the feeder are expected to occur in sequences, and so to correlate at
some time scales. Though this is ostensibly the opposite prediction of response competition, it depends
crucially on the scale of measurement. Behaviours that occur in sequences should simultaneously
correlate positively at some time scales and negatively at others. Accordingly, we found that correlation
coefficients for lever contact and nosing the feeder over test sessions were negative only at the shortest
time scales (2, 4, 6 s segments), and only insubstantially (mean r = −0.03), while the same data were
correlated positively at intermediate time scales (30, 40, 50 s segments), and were uncorrelated at longer
time scales (figure 10). Again, there was no correlation between these measures when considered in 10 s
segments, as also reported in Dwyer et al. [6], contrary to the response competition explanation. Note
that our chambers are larger than those used in [1] and [6], potentially affording greater opportunity for
responses to interfere with each other.
Note furthermore that the response competition explanation requires more than a merely significant
negative correlation between lever contact and nosing the feeder, but a substantial one. Attempting
to explain an effect of one variable in terms of covariation with another requires establishing that the
association is sufficiently strong to account for the observed effect. A correlation unable to account for
the whole effect loses any ostensible parsimony. In the present case, the degree of association between
group membership and nosing of the food trough during the CS was substantial, approximated as
η2 = 0.67 (from F and d.f., perhaps charitably [40]). In order to account for these data solely in terms
of association with lever contact, therefore, would require a strong correlation (beyond −0.8, according
to these estimates).
If lever contact impedes nosing of a feeder within nose-length, one might expect it to be an even
greater impediment to being at the far end of the chamber. Contrary to this expectation, lever-pressing
subjects managed to be at the far end of the chamber at least as much as RI subjects during the tone. This
is hard to reconcile with appeal to response competition as an explanation for less nosing of the feeder
during the same period.
What does it mean that rats persist with lever contact? Lever contact is not distributed evenly over
time, but occurs in spurts and cycles. That there is greater lever contact on lever-produced presentations
comes as no surprise; this finding does not contribute to a response competition explanation, since it
is given by the procedure that LD subjects will have just pressed at each presentation. A response
competition-based hypothesis needs nothing more, and gives nothing more in terms of specific





5.6. Interdependence of motivational modes is not response competition
A behaviour systems view attributes the pattern in focus to a manner of competition among motivational
modes, such that related behaviours occur in meaningful sequences rather than all at once. Despite
superficial similarity with the response competition explanation, an important distinction is worth
stressing. In some cases, a conflict among behaviours may be an artefact of a specific apparatus
or procedure. For instance, increasing the spacing between two response levers is likely to affect
performance without reflecting a difference in competence of the animal. In some cases, however,
dependence among behaviours is a quality of the actor, and contributes to apt timing of behaviour in
meaningful ways. A foraging rat, for instance, might advantageously alternate between exploiting a
known food source and exploring abroad. The same rat might interleave grooming or defecating with
only some sorts of foraging, court before mating, not mate while hunting, not hunt while sleeping, and
generally perform behaviours in sequences that may be complexly determined but far from random.
Many cases of separation among behaviours are not produced by simple physical incompatibilities, but
by the structure of motivational systems. We present evidence that Blaisdell et al.’s [1] demonstration is
such a case.
An important difference among these views concerns the applicability of normative or rational
theories, such as Bayesian networks. Only if a pattern of behaviour reflects a competence of the animal
might application of normative theories, in principle, be appropriate. This is true whether the competence
involves figuring with mental models or well-structured motivational systems.
6. Conclusion
Blaisdell et al. [1] showed that responding to a conditional stimulus was less when it was self-produced
than otherwise, in a way that matches a view of causal reasoning. We analysed this demonstration,
considering the specific apparatus, procedures and measurement scheme used, with attention to the
motivational system evoked, and the way the structure of that system constrains and directs behaviour.
Just using data from a partial replication of the original experiment, there are several lines of evidence
that bear on the questions raised.
First, our subjects did show reduced feeder-directed responding to the self-produced stimulus relative
to response-independent, reaffirming the key prediction. Second, we show that prior attempts to explain
this in terms of causal-model representational maps, or to dismiss it as response competition, fail to
account for a closer look at the data, quantitatively and even qualitatively. Much of our critique regards
omissions that become apparent with a change in perspective, but there are also patterns of results that
are directly counter to both views. This failure extends more generally to views that explain the effect in
terms of reduction of expectation (e.g. [21]) or processing limitations [22]. Subjects are neither discounting
self-produced stimuli, nor are they distracted by the lever press itself.
Our behaviour systems-based hypothesis does account for the observed pattern of results, and makes
sense of a wider range of behaviour. By presenting the stimulus only at the moment of lever contact, the
experiment focuses on a very specific motivational circumstance. When lever contact is viewed, not as
an arbitrary operant, but as a part of a sequence of behaviour related to feeding, the observed response
topographies become interpretable.
An important aspect of CMT is that it conflates two different kinds of question. There are questions
about rationality, and questions about mentality. We have no flags to wave against either kind of analysis,
in principle. However, the data of the present and related studies are relevant to rationality, and they have
been used to draw conclusions about mental manifestation. An analysis in terms of rationality leaves
gaps, and how those gaps are filled warrants care.
What does this say about causal reasoning in rats? In principle, Bayesian networks still provides
a permissible description of our subjects’ behaviour. However, this alone says very little. Drawing a
connection between this very abstract description and an understanding of rats’ behaviour or cognition
requires theoretical bridgework. CMT provided one such answer, but one that our data oblige us to
reject. Furthermore, even if there were clarity about how to apply these hypothetical network models
to cognition in the animal, the Bayesian networks analysis only makes predictions if we specify a
structure. Doing so in this case required commitment to a complex set of further assumptions, which,
whether properly attributable to CMT or not, we found insufficiently justified. The response competition
explanation was important to address in this regard, for it suggested the demonstration may have
been a consequence of the apparatus or procedure, rather than a quality of the animal. Rejection of





terms of Bayesian networks to be appropriate. Our rejection of both the causal model and response
competition hypotheses, therefore, leaves Bayesian networks unscathed, but ineffectual. Affirmation of a
single, isolated prediction, heavily loaded with weakly justified assumptions is only very weak support.
Even so, insights from graphical models-based perspectives are worth retaining. Although still largely
human-centred, theoretical developments among views that reference graphical models are maturing in
promising directions (e.g. [33,41–43]; see also [3,44]; for an overview of specifically non-human causal
reasoning work, see [45]).
More positively, the present study supports an integrative approach. The framing graphical model-
based views, like Bayesian networks, require may be provided by behaviour systems, such that an
analysis of the focal demonstration in terms of causal reasoning may yet be appropriate. Behaviour
systems theory is not a theory of causal reasoning, but it can provide theoretical scaffolding for such
a theory, to make sense of a wider range of behaviour. Having an analysis of the experimental situation
in terms of motivational systems is meaningful on its own, but this gains additional significance
in integration with a complementary analysis in terms of cognitive processes or rationality. A fuller
description of the behaviour of rats in these circumstances reveals striking behavioural patterns not
foreseen by theories of causal reasoning (see also [9]). If the experiment meaningfully captures causal
reasoning, these variables may have bearing on how rats deal with cause and effect in analogous
circumstances.
Finding against a specific theory of causal reasoning does not entitle denial of rats’ capacity for causal
reasoning. Even if relevant theories were sophisticated and plentiful, and none of them stood to empirical
testing, the conclusion that rats are incapable of causal reasoning would still not follow. If theories of
gravity all fail, the phenomenon would be no less present than before, just like the ability of rats to deal
well with cause and effect. The cognitive sophistication of rats does not turn on our success or failure to
describe it.
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